Sami Ullah
Distortion and even elimination of certain histories is not uncommon. Whoever holds the reins of power tries to present the history glorifying himself and his struggle, while trying to get rid of the narratives of the underdogs. As a student who spent all his school years reading the state narrative and its glorification, I feel a responsibility to do something about it. This series of articles, starting from the case of Balochistan, is an effort towards that end; of presenting a Pakistani history from the perspective of its people and not the state. And because I am writing this for young readers, an effort was made to make this brief, easy-to-read and jargon-free.
After stating what this article is about let’s begin with the time in history when Indian subcontinent was divided into Pakistan and India by the British when they agreed to leave the region.
Pakistan declared its independence but there were several areas and territories that were not part of any agreement to be or not to be part of the newly created state; most notable among them were Bahawalpur states union, northern areas of NWFP, and Balochistan. It’s the condition of Balochistan that will be the focus of my effort to analyze and try to answer a question that is of grave concern to some of our young students who dare to ask those questions.
Balochistan wasn’t a single political entity as we usually conceive it to be. Northern part of it was under the direct rule of a British Commissioner; this sort of arrangement was quite different from other entities under British rule : 1) provinces, that had a legislature and 2) princely states, lead by kings and princes as they had some type of legal arrangement with the British – while Northern Balochistan was under the direct rule of a British bureaucrat, the commissioner. This part of balochistan was annexed into Pakistan immediately after Independence from british rule; a shahi Jirga in Quetta had ratified this annexation. Its quite interesting because Baloch leaders donot recognize this act as legitimate; according to them the people who were present in that Jirga were non-baloch settlers. And if we take a look at the annexation of Southern balochistan, where the majority of territory lies , the legitimacy of annexation becomes even more precarious.
Southern Balochistan comprised the areas of Lasbela, Makran, Kharan and Kalat. These entities were lead by their own tribal leaders. There, annexation were brought under dubious conditions; their leaders were threatened by the presence of Pakistani army during negotiations. Firstly, instruments of accession were signed in Lasbela, Makran, and Kharan. This accession and the march of Pakistani army into those areas was the condition under which Khan of Kalat, Ahmedyar Khan, had no option but to sign the accession of Kalat. Its quite interesting to note that these negotiations, particularly the negotiation with Khan of Kalat were carried out by Jinnah himself as Jinnah was a close friend of Khan of Kalat. But this act was not acceptable for Prince Karim, the younger brother of Khan, and he decided to move to Afghanistan and start an armed struggle against the state of Pakistan.
When Khan heard that his brother had announced to rebel against the state, he issued a proclamation that he will not support his brother in the armed struggle and requested the Prince to surrender. Prince and his men were deeply demoralized by this proclamation; they decided to return to kalat, abandoning their plans of instigating a rebellion. Upon entering Balochistan his party was ambushed and Prince was arrested. He was kept in jail for next 7 years. While Karim was in jail, there was a lot going on in the politics of Pakistan. As we all know that the constituent assembly wasnot able to formulate the constitution and that provided a window of opportunity for the non-democratic forces- the military-bureaucratic alliance- to take the matters into their hands and further stifle the democratic culture; from then on we have been in that vicious cycle.
In 1952, all the southern states – Lasbela, Kharan, Makran and Kalat – were merged to form a single entity. To compensate the disgruntled Ahmadyar Khan, his privy purse was substantially increased. Khan was not happy but he wasn’t vocal about it either at this stage. But this was going to change soon, with the implementation of the one unit scheme in 1955.
Military-bureaucratic establishment had been working behind the scenes to create a political formula where the east and west Pakistan would balance each other – the plan to merge all the territorial units in west Pakistan to create “One Unit”. The rationale put forth by those in power was that there is no Sindhi, Baloch, Pashtun, Seraiki, Punjabi; we are all Pakistanis. They perfectly understood that this ideology couldn’t be farther from the truth, but still this scheme was forcibly implemented and whoever among the politicians opposed this scheme were dealt with by the Governor General Ghulam Muhammad; chief ministers of almost all provinces opposed this plan and consequently were either replaced or Governor rule was enacted in that province.
Khan of Kalat, Ahmadyar khan, vocally protested against the plan and began to organize political support from other Baloch tribes. Khan could’nt accept the bribe like he was willing to, in the previous arrangement; along with other Baloch leaders he was arrested. Watching the situation unfold, all the tribes became enraged at the Pakistani authorities. One unit scheme was too much for them already, but the amount of repression with which this was implemented upon them warranted that they had to stand up against the state.
Nouroz Khan, a 90 year old leader of the Zarakzai tribe, was able to put up an armed struggle in a guerilla warfare fashion. Nouroz Khan demands were clear – release the Khan of Kalat and abolish the One Unit. This was the first incident of a properly organized armed insurgency. Although the insurgency was ultimately crushed, and it phased out in 1959 under President Ayub, but Its important to note the way in which the movement of crushed; state authorities agreed to negotiate when talking to a one of the leaders by the name of Doda khan Zarakzai – this verbal agreement was brokered on the Holy Quran – but when the rebels came down from the mountains to negotiate with the government as per agreement, they were arrested along the Nouroz khan himself and later sentenced to life imprisonment. Nouroz insurgency had failed badly because the leaders couldn’t anticipate the hypocrisy of the state authorities, nevertheless it left a clear message that Baloch will never accept the dictation of the Pakistani establishment; and the tribes who were previously passive – Marri and Bugti – now decided to organize themselves to form a proper resistance front.
A second insurgency propped up in 1963 under the leadership of Sher Muhmmad Bijrani Marri, which continued until 1969. It was during these tensions when Pakistani military began constructing garrisons and guarded outposts in those areas. The pretext to build these setups was to defend the people of Balochistan against their “terrorist” tribal leaders; and to enable the region for development. During this fight, there were periods of relative calm and periods of high tensions – exchange of fire and deaths – but freedom fighters only stopped when President Ayub stepped down and Chief Martial Law Administrator General Yahya annulled the ‘One unit scheme’. Balochistan was recognized as a separate province. This was an opportunity for political forces in balochistan to integrate themselves with the parliamentary and electoral politics of Pakistan, and they did take advantage of this; in 1972 baloch nationalists, coalesced under the umbrella of National Awami Party (NAP), and won elections alongside pushtun nationalists in NWFP.
National Awami party became the principle opposition party in the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto whose Pakistan Peoples Party had won elections in Punjab and Sindth. But after less than a year, Bhutto got rid of NAP government in both provinces. Several reasons has been put forth by scholars, but most convincing of the arguments is that Bhutto’s authoritarian temperament could’nt accept an opposition party of this stature and especially their leader Wali Khan who was becoming a serious rival of his in the National politics. This action by Bhutto has been termed crucial by political scholars because if the government of the NAP was to be allowed to continue, region of NWFP and Balochistan would have been properly integrated into the parliamentary politics of Pakistan.
Soon after the dissolution of NAP a vigorous guerilla warfare was organized by the Marris and Mengals under the banner of Baloch People’s Liberation Front (BPLF). While the Bugti tribe lead by Akbar Bugti sided with Z.A.Bhutto’s government; Akbar Bugti was appointed the new Governor of Balochistan along with the new Chief Minister G.M.Barozai, a Pashtun; and for this reason Bugti tribe is not very well liked by Marris and Mengals.
The guerilla war, as the name suggests, is an asymmetric warfare and not a conventional one; 80,000 Pakistani troops laced with modern war-machines against poorly armed guerillas, who used to practice hit-and-run tactics, quick ambush operations on army camps and sabotaging the convoys. This phase of the ‘insurgency’, which lasted until Zia took over as Chief Martial Law administrator, resulted in the loss of 3,000 Pakistani troops and 5,300 guerillas. As soon as Zia took hold of the power, he announced a general amnesty for the nationalist leaders, and released several of them who were languishing under state custodies and jails.
General Zia invited the Baloch leaders in Rawalpindi to negotiate on possible solutions for the Baloch question. This move by Zia is used as an argument by pro-dictatorial voices in our country to sugar coat all the previous atrocities committed by the state in the Baloch region; every sane human being would recognize that when you humiliate a nation by beating them to death, you cannot demand from them to sit with you on a table immediately and negotiate. But still some of the Baloch leaders like Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo were willing to talk, while most of the other leaders including Khair Bakhsh Marri and Attaullah Mengal excused themselves for not accepting the invitation.
And if General Zia was really serious about solving the Baloch question, shouldn’t had he taken some concrete steps? For example, resolving the issue of non-Baloch settlers – that included Punjabi bureaucrats – who were encroaching upon fertile land of Balochistan, under the guise of development schemes; another issue which could have been dealt with was the huge presence of military troops in the area that were becoming a nuisance for the local population; and don’t forget that Zia was not an elected leader himself, how could he make the Baloch people have an autonomous and elected leadership? In fact, this last point was raised by Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo during his exchange of talks with General Zia; he had told Zia that an unelected national government is not the solution, he must conduct elections and let the people choose their representatives who could have a government according to the constitution. Zia was not serious about the long-term stability of the province, just as Bhutto, Yahya, Ayub, Iskandar Mirza, Ghulam Muhammad weren’t serious.
Even after more than 30 years of struggle, the Pakistani establishment wasn’t willing to budge. It was all natural that the coming generations of Baloch were becoming more radical; demands that were previously limited to political autonomy was shifting towards out-right separation from the state; while state institutions were busy inventing new ways to exploit the Baloch land as it was rich in resources like copper, zinc, Gold and more notably natural gas.
During the democratic interlude of the 1990s, nationalist parties re-emerged to compete in the political arena. Two major factions in Baloch politics emerged: Akhtar Mengal’s Balochistan National Movement, renamed later as Balochistan National Party (BNP), and Akbar Bugti’s Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP). From 1988 to 2002 these Baloch nationalist parties worked together to form governments in Balochistan meanwhile supporting rival political parties: PML or PPP, in the center; Mengal’s BNP supported PPP while Bugti’s JWP supported PML. Centre-province tensions never subsided but the attitude of Baloch nationalists remained considerably cooperative; even when Nawaz Sharif violated the agreement and dismissed the Mengal’s government of 1997. BNP had supported Nawaz Sharif’s move to get rid of the 8th amendment in return for provincial autonomy but Nawaz didn’t keep his promise and dismissed the government in Balochistan. Earlier, the nuclear tests were conducted in Baloch territory without consulting the provincial government and that too caused much discomfort in nationalist circles. Despite all this the nationalists kept their faith in electoral politics – at least their grievances were being heard and contemplated upon by the mainstream politicians. But this developing peace process in the center-province relations was cut short when the 2002 elections were rigged by the Musharraf regime to oust the nationalist political parties from the political scene, instead a coalition government of PML-Q and MMA alliance was installed.
Musharraf had justified his coup of 1999 by presenting himself as a reformer; he said he wanted to devolve the power from the center and usher in a genuine democracy; Musharraf was also popular among liberals for having a soft corner for secularism. Soon, people who favored him initially recognized that as an empty rhetoric and the rigging of 2002 elections made it all more clear that Punjabi-dominated military government wanted to consolidate power by marginalizing the Baloch nationalists. And the local government structure which was ostensibly designed to devolve power was actually acting as a client-cadres for maintaining the military regime. This trick employed by Musharraf – the local government model – was the same trick used by President Ayub in 1960s to maintain himself in power.
Significant developments took place that revived the armed conflict in Balochistan. One of those developments was the construction of Gwadar port which was now completed. Baloch had already seen their gas fields and mines being used to siphon off wealth elsewhere; they weren’t going to accept the kind of development which keeps the local population as much impoverished as they were before those projects. On 3 May 2004, three Chinese engineers were assassinated using a remote-controlled car bomb as they were going for work at Gwadar; Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) claimed the responsibility. BLA cadres have been traced back to the BPLF’s guerillas, who fought during the Bhutto era. Intensity of violence escalated after a heart-wrenching case of Dr. Shazia Khalid; she was raped by an army officer on 2 January 2005 in Sui Hospital Complex associated with the Petroleum Plant at Sui. It was considered by Akbar Bugti as an attack on the honor of Bugti tribe, as Dr. Shazia Khalid was a “protected guest”. It was this event that turned Akbar Bugti, a staunch ally of the central government since the days of Bhutto, into a bitter enemy. Bugti tried to prevent an official cover up of the case; army was not allowing the police to interrogate the suspects. Bitter verbal exchange by Akbar Bugti soon escalated into an armed conflict and it was under the banner of Baloch Republican Army (BRA). He had to leave his home in Dera Bugti and flee to a cave in Bhamboor hills. Another insurgency led by the Marri tribe was also active; a considerable amount of guerillas in the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) were form the Marri. Situation was ripe for these tribes to set aside their differences and present a common Baloch front. They continued to fight together even after the martyrdom of Akbar Bugti on 26 August 2006; F16s and helicopter gunships had carpet bombed the area to kill the rebel leader. While the Insurgency continued well into the year 2007, and the activity subsided after President Zardari came into office.
Since the 2008 government of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), there have been efforts by politicians to find a long-term solution and the 18th amendment to the constitution is an effort towards healing the center-periphery relations. 18th amendments provides for the autonomy of the provinces, but to this day the autonomy has not been granted in practice; appointments of chief ministers and his cabinet has always been a contentious issue – and still is – because those control over these provincial offices is still in the hands of the establishment in Islamabad; even the mayor of Quetta is appointed after approval from the center. The next year, another initiative by PPP-government was the approval of a 39-point agenda – the Balochistan Package – for uplifting of Balochistan and to appease the nationalist forces.
The Balochistan Package included basically what the Baloch nationalists were demanding: withdrawal of military cantonments, judicial inquiry of the murder of Akbar Bugti, a better formula for the National Finance Commission award, compensation / royalties for the extraction of resources from Balochistan, Gwadar Development Authority to be placed under the supervision of provincial government etc. Although a lot of effort was put into this package but most of its points were not implemented. And the package was not received with much enthusiasm by the nationalist leaders, because of what they had experienced in past seventy years.
A continuous onslaught by the establishment in Islamabad, to forcibly integrate the Baloch region into the larger Pakistan has turned even the moderate leaders of the region into bitter enemies who have no option but to see every step by the establishment with much suspicion; they can’t trust the motives and justifiably so. The situation is so damning that Balochistan could be considered at the point of no return, as Sardar Attaullah Mengal, said in a press conference after talks with Nawaz Sharif in 2011. But, he also hinted at the way forward and to put a last ditch effort to reconcile with people of Balochistan, especially its youth. We better listen to what Attaullah Mengal was saying and here I would like to end this brief historical overview with a YouTube link to that press conference: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bs8QoiOI5Qc.
